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Will Border Carbon Adjustments Work? 
Niven Winchester*,†,‡, Sergey Paltsev*, and John Reilly* 
Abstract 
The potential for greenhouse gas (GHG) restrictions in some nations to drive emission increases in other 
nations, or leakage, is a contentious issue in climate change negotiations. We evaluate the potential for border 
carbon adjustments (BCAs) to address leakage concerns using an economy-wide model. For 2025, we find that 
BCAs reduce leakage by up to two-thirds, but result in only modest reductions in global emissions and significantly 
reduce welfare. In contrast, BCA-equivalent leakage reductions can be achieved by very small emission charges or 
efficiency improvements in nations targeted by BCAs, which have negligible welfare effects. We conclude that BCAs 
are a costly method to reduce leakage but such policies may be effective coercion strategies. We also investigate the 
impact of BCAs on sectoral output and evaluate the leakage contributions of trade and changes in the price of crude 
oil. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been longstanding concern about the competitiveness and leakage effects when 
some countries implement emissions reductions policies while others do not. Early studies of the 
Kyoto Protocol examined the potential for leakage—an increase in emissions in countries not 
covered by policy that result from impacts on global energy prices or from relocation of energy 
intensive industry from countries with controls to those without them (e.g. Bernstein, et al., 
1999).  Concerns among domestic industries, especially those involved in energy intensive 
production activities, often are directed towards a loss of competitiveness, fearing that imports of 
similar products that do not face higher energy prices due to carbon policy will gain an 
advantage over domestically produced goods.  That is one channel of leakage—growth in foreign 
production of energy intensive goods, and the emissions that go with it, at the expense of 
domestic production of similar goods. Concerns about such leakage are reflected in the bill 
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives as the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
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(H.R. 2454) of 2009, commonly known as the Waxman-Markey Bill (U.S. Congress, 2009a). 
Title IV, Subtitle A of H.R. 2454 seeks to “prevent an increase in greenhouse gas emissions in 
countries other than the U.S.” (p. 1087) by requiring importers of certain products to purchase 
emission allowances, a measure analogous to a tariff. It is unclear whether border carbon 
adjustments (BCAs), or tariffs on embodied GHG emissions, are permissible under existing trade 
laws, but some authors argue that World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions for border tax 
adjustments (BTAs) provides scope for such charges. 
The Bill does not reference competiveness concerns but it appears that members of the House 
were mindful of such issues when designing the Bill. Indeed, in the discussion draft of the Bill, 
Subtitle A of Title IV was labeled “Ensuring Domestic Competiveness” with the purpose “to 
compensate the owners and operators of entities in eligible domestic industrial sectors and 
subsectors for carbon emission costs” (U.S. Congress, 2009b, p. 537). It is also likely that 
competitiveness concerns will be important in Senate negotiations. Shortly after the Bill passed 
the House vote, Michigan Senator Stabenow asserted that keeping BCAs in the legislation was 
her biggest concern. Similar sentiments were echoed by other senators from states with large 
manufacturing industries, including Ohio Senator Brown, “I don’t think you can fully take care 
of manufacturing [and pass the Bill] without some border equalization” (Hale, 2009). 
Additionally, Democrat Senator John Kerry and Republican Senator Lindsey Graham voiced 
their support for climate change legislation in a New Your Times Article, providing that BCAs 
are included (Kerry and Graham, 2009). Senator Graham’s view indicates that Republican 
support for H.R.5425 in the Senate may hinge on the inclusion of BCA provisions. 
Although H.R. 2454 was approved by the House of Representatives in June 2009, political 
arguments for BCAs are not new. Notably, forerunners to H.R. 2454 – the Bingaman-Specter (S. 
1766) and Lieberman-Warner (S. 2191) Bills – included instruments tantamount to tariffs on 
embodied GHG emissions. Elsewhere, French President Sarkozy has voiced that the EU should  
impose additional tariffs on imports from countries that do not restrict GHG emissions, a 
proposal that has be criticized by the EU’s Environmental Commissioner but has reportedly been 
supported by a number of EU member states (ICTSD, 2009a). 
Opposing the view of the U.S. and the EU, countries that do not plan near-term GHG 
reductions, particularly India and China, have voiced concerns about GHG border measures. At 
informal climate talks in Bonn, Germany in August 2009, Indian officials put forth a resolution 
that developed countries shall not resort to any form of countervailing border measures against 
imports from developing countries (ICTSD, 2009b). If BCAs eventuate, Columbia Economist 
Jagdish Bhagwati claims that they will lead to massive, justified, WTO-legal retaliation by India 
and China (Hale, 2009). President Obama is wary of such concerns and has criticized the Bill’s 
provision for BCAs (Broder, 2009). 
Tariffs imposed by nations that restrict GHG emissions (the climate coalition) on imports 
from regions that do not control emissions (the non-coalition) have been evaluated by a series of 
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computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies.1 In this literature, BCAs have mixed leakage 
impacts while there is broad agreement that tariffs will significantly reduce welfare and will be 
ineffective at addressing competitive concerns.2 We contribute to the debate by evaluating the 
economic impacts of BCAs on embodied GHG emissions using the MIT Emissions Prediction 
and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, a CGE model tailored to evaluate climate policy questions. 
We analyze tariffs in the context of a scenario representative of a post-Kyoto climate agreement 
and the special features of tariff provisions in H.R. 2454. Our study further builds on previous 
work by evaluating the efficiency of tariffs relative to direct leakage controls, and assessing the 
relative leakage contributions of trade and the decline in the oil price induced by GHG 
restrictions. 
Section 2 of this paper details provisions for BCAs in H.R. 2454 and discusses international 
trade rules surrounding these measures. Our modeling framework is detailed in Section 3 and 
results are discussed in Section 4. Alternative leakage controls are analyzed in Section 5. Section 
6 concludes. 
2. BCA LEGISLATION 
The International Reserve Allowance Program in H.R. 2454 requires importers of covered 
goods in “eligible industrial sectors” to purchase emission allowances related to the amount of 
GHG emissions embodied in imported products. Eligible industrial sectors are defined using 
three concepts: energy intensity, GHG intensity and trade intensity. Energy intensity in H.R. 
2454 is calculated by dividing the cost of purchased electricity and fuel costs by the value of 
output. GHG intensity is determined by multiplying the number of tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions from fuel combustion, processing and electricity by 20 and then dividing by 
the value of output. Trade intensity is defined as the sum of the value of imports and exports 
divided by the sum of the value of output and the value of imports.  
A sector is eligible for the program if it has (i) an energy intensity or a GHG intensity greater 
than 5%, and a trade intensity greater than 15%, or (ii) an energy intensity or a GHG intensity 
greater than 20%. Several restrictions circumvent these rules. First, a sector is excluded if 85% or 
more of U.S. imports in that sector are produced in countries that either have economy-wide 
GHG reduction programs at least as stringent as in the U.S. as part of an international agreement, 
or have equal or lower energy or GHG intensities than the U.S. Second, imports sourced from 
nations responsible for less than 0.5% of global GHG emissions and accounting for less than 5% 
of U.S. imports in the sector in question are exempt. Third, products from the least-developed 
nations and refined petroleum products are excluded. 
H.R. 2454 requires that the price for international reserve allowances equals the clearing price 
from the most recent auction of allowances, but does not specify how the GHG content of 
                                                             
1 See, for example, Babiker and Rutherford (2005), Droge and Kemfret (2005), Peterson and Schleich (2007), 
Burniux et al. (2008), Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008), and Mckibbon and Wilcoxen (2009). 
2 BCAs are also investigated in partial equilibrium analyses. See, for example, Gielen and Moriguchi (2002), 
Demailly and Quirion (2008), and Ponsand and Walker (2008). 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imports will be calculated. Instead, the Bill requires the administrator to establish “a general 
methodology for calculating the quantity of international reserve allowances that a U.S. importer 
of any covered good must submit” (U.S. Congress, 2009a, p. 1123). The administrator must also 
adjust the number of international emission allowances per unit imported to account for the 
benefits to eligible industrial sectors from emission allowance rebates and the provision of free 
allowances to electricity. 
One issue is whether the trade provisions of H.R. 2454 are legal under WTO rules and this 
may depend on how they are classified relative to existing trade-related measures. The extra 
import charges called for by H.R. 2454 could be branded punitive tariffs, countervailing duties 
(imposed on the basis that unregulated GHG emissions in foreign countries are illegal subsidies) 
or BTAs (additional taxes on imports to offset differences in tax structures across countries). A 
number of studies examine whether BCAs are consistent with rules governing international trade 
set out by the WTO3. The consensus in this literature is that punitive tariffs violate tariff 
concession rules specified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); 
countervailing duties violate both GATT rules and the WTO’s Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures agreement; but BTAs may be possible under WTO law. In this connection, a joint 
report by the WTO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (WTO-UNEP, 
2009, p. 89) notes that “the general approach under WTO rules has been to acknowledge that 
some degree of trade restriction may be necessary to achieve certain policy objectives, as long as 
a number of carefully crafted conditions are respected.” 
GATT Article II.2(a) details rules governing BTAs on imports, allowing countries to impose a 
charge equivalent to an internal tax on imports under certain conditions. Indirect taxes (taxes on 
products such as sales taxes) are eligible for adjustment but direct taxes (levies on producers 
such as payroll taxes) are not, so a key issue is whether taxes on inputs such as energy are 
indirect taxes. Article II.2(a) also stipulates that BTAs on imports are only allowed (i) in respect 
to articles from which the imported product has been produced, and (ii)  against taxes imposed 
on “like” domestic products (GATT, 1986, p. 4). Some authors conclude that the wording of (i) 
restricts the use of BTAs to inputs physically incorporated in the final product, which would 
exclude emissions charges. However, others argue that (ii) allows BTAs to be used to offset 
taxes on inputs used during the production process (i.e., applied indirectly on products), which 
provides scope for WTO-legal BTAs for GHG emissions. 
Two historical cases are directly relevant for BCAs. First, in U.S.-Taxes on Petroleum and 
Certain Imported Substances (the Superfund case) a GATT dispute settlement panel allowed 
BTAs on chemicals contained in imported petroleum products. However, the panel did not 
specifically state that the substance had to be physically present in the final product (Neumayer, 
2001). Second, in the late 1980s, the U.S. introduced a tax on ozone-depleting chemicals (ODCs) 
                                                             
3 See, for example, Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2007), Bordoff (2009), Biermann and Brohm (2005), Frankel (2009), 
Goh (2004), Green and Epps (2008), Hoerner (1998), Brewer (2008), Pauwelyn (2007), Ismer and Neuhoff 
(2007), and WTO-UNEP (2009). 
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in order to implement the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The 
tariff was applied to both ODCs and products containing or produced using these chemicals, but 
the legality of such measures is uncertain as the tariffs were never challenged under WTO rules 
(Brack et al., 2000). 
GATT Article XX, which details general exceptions, provides another avenue to argue for 
BCAs. Two relevant exceptions include Article XX(b) and Article XX(g). Article XX(b) allows 
import restrictions that violate trade rules to be applied if they are necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, and Article XX(g) relates to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.4 The process for determining the legality of GHG border measures is that, once 
implemented, countries “harmed” by the measures would need to lodge a complaint with the 
WTO, which would result in a ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body. In the absence of such a 
judgment, in remaining sections, we set aside legal issues and assume that BCAs are allowable 
under one or more of the above categories.  
3. MODELING FRAMEWORK 
We assess the economic and leakage impacts of BCAs using version four of the MIT EPPA 
model. EPPA is described in detailed by Paltsev et al. (2005) and we outline the core features of 
the model below. EPPA is a multi-regional, CGE model of the global economy that links GHG 
emissions to economic activity, and is solved through time in recursive dynamic fashion in five-
year increments. There is a single representative utility maximizing agent in each region that 
derives income from factor payments and emissions permits and allocates expenditure across 
goods and investment. There is also a government sector in each region that collects revenue 
from taxes and purchases goods and services. Government deficits and surpluses are passed to 
consumers as lump sum transfers. 
As illustrated in Table 1, EPPA recognizes Agriculture, five energy sectors (Coal, Crude oil, 
Refined oil, Gas and Electricity), two manufacturing sectors (Energy intensive industry and 
Other industry), Transportation and Services. Each good is produced by perfectly competitive 
firms that assemble primary factors and intermediate inputs. All goods are traded internationally 
and, following Armington (1969), goods are differentiated by region of origin using a constant 
elasticity of substitution function, except for Crude oil (which is treated as a homogenous 
commodity). Alternative electricity generation technologies in EPPA enhance abatement options. 
Electricity can be produced using conventional technologies (e.g., electricity from coal and gas) 
and technologies not currently in use but which may become profitable as the emissions price 
rises (e.g., large scale wind generation and electricity from coal or gas with carbon capture and 
storage). As also indicated in Table 1, primary inputs include three non-energy resources and 
seven energy resources. Capital and labor are free to move between sectors and land is specific 
to agriculture. Each energy resource is sector specific. Crude and shale oil resources are perfect 
                                                             
4 See Buck and Verheyen (2001) and Heinzerling (2007) for a discussion of legal issues associated with BCAs under 
Article XX. 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substitutes in the oil sector, and the hydro, nuclear and wind & solar resources are specific to 
electricity generation technologies. 
 
Table 1. EPPA aggregation. 
Regions Sectors Primary inputs 
Annex 1 Agriculture (AGRI) Non-energy resources 
United States (U.S.A) Coal (COAL) Capital 
Canada (CAN) Oil (OIL) Labor 
Japan (JPN) Refined oil (ROIL) Land 
Australia-New Zealand (ANZ) Gas (GAS)  
European Uniona (EUR) Electricity (ELEC) Energy resources 
Eastern Europeb (EET) Energy intensive industry (EINT) Crude oil 
Former Soviet Unionc (FSU) Other industry (OTHR) Shale oil 
 Services (SERV) Natural Gas 
Non-Annex 1 Transportation (TRAN) Coal 
Mexico (MEX)  Hydro 
Higher Income East Asiad (ASI)  Nuclear 
China (CHN)  Wind & Solar 
India (IND)   
Indonesia (IDZ)   
Africa (AFR)   
Middle East (MES)   
Central & South America (LAM)   
Rest of Worlde (ROW)   
aThe EU-15 plus countries of the European Free Trade Area (Norway, Switzerland & Iceland); 
bHungury, Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia & Slovenia; cRussia, Ukraine, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan & Uzbekistan; dSouth Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan & Thailand. 
EPPA tracks the use of energy commodities (Coal, Refined oil and Gas) used in each sector 
measured in exajoules. These data combined with emissions per-exajoule coefficients for each 
energy commodity allow the model to predict (CO2) emissions. EPPA also traces non-CO2 
GHGs (e.g., methane, and nitrous oxide) measured in CO2 equivalent (CO2-e) units using global 
warming potential (GWP) weights. GWP weights measure the ability of non-CO2 gases to trap 
heat in the atmosphere relative to the heat-trapping capability of CO2 over a 100 year period. 
When GHG emissions are restricted, the model calculates a shadow value associated with the 
emission constraint, which is analogous to an emission price that would develop under a cap-
and-trade program. The model is calibrated using economic data from the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) database (Dimaranan, 2006) and energy balance data from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA).  
3.1 Embodied GHGs and BCAs 
As noted above, H.R. 2454 does not set out how embodied GHG emissions will be calculated. 
Following Rutherford and Babiker (1997), we use a comprehensive approach where total GHG 
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emissions embodied in each commodity are the sum of direct and indirect emissions.5 Direct 
emissions are immediately linked with production, such as the combustion of fossil fuels to 
produce energy. Indirect emissions are associated with production of products used as 
intermediate inputs. For example, total emissions for automobiles equal emissions from the 
consumption of energy used in automobile manufacturing plus emissions associated with the 
production of steel and other intermediate inputs. Our calculations employ equation (1):   
X= AX + D (1) 
where X is an N!1 vector of total emissions per dollar for each of the N commodities; A is an 
N!N matrix, the ijth element of which is the number of dollars of good i used per dollar of good j 
being produced; and D is an N!1 vector of sectoral direct emissions coefficients per dollar of 
output. 
Assuming that imported intermediate inputs embody the same quantities of GHG emissions as 
intermediate inputs sourced domestically, total embodied GHG emissions are computed by 
solving (1) for X: 
X= (I-X)-1D (2) 
BCAs are determined by embodied GHG emissions, calculated using equation (2), and carbon 
prices. For each applicable trade flow, we select an ad valorem tariff on imports of sector i from 
region s to r, !i,s,r, so as to increase the price of imports from s by the additional costs incurred by 
region s producers if they faced the carbon price in r. That is, !s is determined simultaneously 
with the carbon price so that:  
"i,s,rpi,s = pcarbrxi,s (3) 
where pi,s,r is the price of sector i in region s, pcarbr is the CO2-e price in region r, and xi,s is per-
dollar emissions embodied in production of i in s. 
Embodied GHG calculations and BCA assignments are updated at the end of each modeling 
period but we do not adjust BCAs to account for the distribution of emission allowances 
specified in H.R. 2454, as such allowances are lump-sum transfers and will not influence firm 
behavior in our model. 
3.2 BCA Scenarios 
Yardsticks for BCA simulations are provided by business as usual (BAU) and cap-and-trade 
(CAT) scenarios, which we source from EPPA’s evaluation of the Energy Modeling Forum’s 
Climate Change Control Scenario described in Paltsev et al. (2009). In BAU, population and 
labor productivity advance at predetermined rates and there are no GHG restrictions, but 
autonomous improvements in energy efficiency and responses to rising energy prices as 
resources deplete lead to GHG emissions growing at a slower rate than GDP. The CAT scenario 
used in Paltsev et al. (2009) gradually reduces U.S. GHG emissions to 80% below 2000 
                                                             
5 We focus on the impact of BCAs that accurately target embodied GHG emissions and ignore monitoring costs. If 
monitoring costs are high, broad-brush trade measures may be preferred to targeted instruments (Engle, 2004). 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emissions between 2015 and 2050, progressively reduces emissions in other Annex 1 regions 
except the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to 50% below 1990 levels between 2010 and 2050, and 
restricts emission in the FSU, China, India and Central and South America beginning in 2030. As 
it is unlikely that BCAs will be imposed after regions such as China and India begin to price 
emissions and EPPA has a five-year time step, we focus on the period prior to 2030 when only 
Annex 1 regions, excluding the FSU, implement climate policy. For ease of reference, we refer 
to this group as the “coalition” of nations implementing climate policy. In the period we analyze, 
emission allowances in the CAT scenario for each coalition region in each period match those in 
Paltsev et al. (2009). By 2025, relative to 2000, the U.S. reduces emissions by 31% and other 
coalition regions curtail emissions by between 18% and 35%. For simplicity, we do not allow 
banking of emission allowances over time.6 
Although H.R. 2454 proposes BCAs on imports from regions where GHGs are not taxed with 
exemptions for some regions, we consider tariffs on imports from all non-coalition regions to 
simplify the analysis. Also, due to EPPA’s coarse sectoral aggregation, no sector in our model 
meets eligibility criteria for BCAs set out in H.R. 2454. However, the Bill’s BCA provisions are 
clearly aimed at manufactured products, or a subset of these commodities, so we consider BCAs 
for this sector, where manufacturing is defined as Energy intensive industry and Other industry. 
To gauge the impact of the sectoral selectivity of BCAs in H.R. 2454, we also simulate tariffs on 
imports from non-coalition nations for all sectors. Leakage and competitive concerns also exist 
elsewhere, so in other simulations we consider BCAs imposed by all coalition regions, both on 
all sectors and manufacturing independently.  That is, we analyze four BCA scenarios where, in 
addition to emission restrictions outlined in CAT, tariffs are imposed on imports from non-
coalition regions: U.S. tariffs on all sectors (U.S.-ALL), coalition tariffs on all sectors (CLT-
ALL), U.S. tariffs on manufacturing (U.S.-MNF), and coalition tariffs on manufacturing (CLT-
MNF). 
4. MODELING RESULTS 
We focus on results for 2025 as BCAs are largest in this year. To understand what is driving 
our results, Table 2 presents total embodied GHG emissions by sector and region in 2025 
calculated using equation (2). Emissions are reported in millions of metric tons (Mt) of CO2-e 
per U.S. billion dollars of output. Electricity produces significantly more GHG emissions per 
dollar of output than other sectors in most regions. Electricity GHG emissions per dollar are 
highest in China, where 34.4 Mt CO2-e are released per billion dollars of output. Emissions per 
dollar are also relatively high in Agriculture and Energy intensive industry. The numbers in 
Table 2 do not distinguish between gases, but unreported calculations reveal that agriculture 
emissions are largely non-CO2 gases while emissions from Energy intensive industry are 
predominantly CO2. Embodied emissions are also relatively high in Other industry, especially in 
non-coalition regions. 
                                                             
6 Note that these carbon constraints are more stringent than those in the H.R. 2454 because there are no credits from 
outside the capped sectors in the Energy Modeling Forum scenario. 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Comparing carbon emissions across countries indicates that production in China and the FSU 
is relatively emission intensive and, in general, emissions per dollar are higher in non-coalition 
regions than coalition regions. However, care should be taken when making cross-country 
comparisons as the commodity composition of sectors may vary across regions and the number 
of physical units included in billion dollar bundles depends on the purchasing power of the U.S. 
dollar relative to local currencies. Nevertheless, emissions per dollar coefficients in Table 2 are 
appropriate for calculating BCAs. For example, if agriculture production in a region is 
concentrated in GHG intensive commodities, exports from this region will produce more 
emissions than exports from a region that specializes in agriculture commodities that are less 
GHG intensive. Additionally, other factors constant, if a billion dollars buys twice as many units 
in region A as region B, one billion dollars of imports from A will embody twice the amount of 
emissions as imports from B. 
Table 2. Embodied GHG emissions (CO2-e  millions Mt per billion dollars), 2025. 
 AGRI COAL OIL ROIL GAS ELEC EINT OTHR SERV TRAN 
USA 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 4.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 
CAN 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.1 3.2 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 
MEX 0.1 0.1 - 0.8 0.0 1.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 
JPN 2.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.2 8.0 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.8 
ANZ 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.1 4.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 
EUR 1.8 1.0 0.2 1.7 0.4 13.2 2.8 1.4 0.8 1.3 
EET 1.9 - 0.3 2.4 0.2 14.6 2.6 1.2 0.3 1.4 
FSU 8.5 6.2 0.8 2.1 0.6 24.7 6.0 3.0 1.5 2.5 
ASI 5.4 1.4 0.4 1.3 0.4 7.0 2.6 1.4 0.6 2.0 
CHN 4.0 11.6 0.8 2.8 0.7 31.8 4.6 2.5 1.6 1.9 
IND 4.6 3.2 0.8 2.2 0.9 15.8 4.9 2.7 1.0 2.5 
IDZ 3.8 0.9 0.2 1.2 0.3 12.9 4.8 1.8 0.7 1.8 
AFR 5.1 2.2 1.1 2.1 1.3 14.4 5.1 2.6 1.5 2.5 
MES 6.5 - 0.8 1.7 0.6 12.1 4.6 2.5 1.5 3.8 
LAM 4.5 1.9 0.5 1.4 0.4 6.0 1.7 1.3 0.4 1.6 
ROW 4.3 13.3 0.9 2.3 0.5 13.8 3.9 2.0 0.8 1.4 
4.1 Welfare changes 
To focus our discussion, proportional welfare changes relative to BAU, measured as 
equivalent variation changes in consumption, for the U.S., the coalition (both including and 
excluding the U.S.), the non-coalition and the world are reported in Table 3 (and welfare 
changes for each EPPA region are reported in the appendix, Table A1).7 In the CAT scenario (no 
BCAs), U.S. welfare falls by 1.16% and aggregate coalition welfare declines by 0.92%. Non-
coalition welfare declines by 0.23%, although welfare increases in some non-coalition regions 
(see Table A1). The largest gainers from coalition climate change policies are intensive exporters 
of manufacturing products that do not have to pay for GHG emissions, such as China, India and 
                                                             
7 Welfare changes for composite regions (the coalition, the non-coalition and the world) are GDP-weighted averages 
of the welfare changes in Table A2. As we do not specify a welfare function to calculate welfare changes for 
composite regions, figures for composite regions should be interpreted as indicative welfare changes. 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Higher Income East Asia. On the other hand, welfare for the Middle East falls by 2.79% due to 
the decrease in the price of Crude oil, which is also reported in Table 3. In aggregate, global 
welfare falls by 0.70%. Although results are expressed relative to BAU for all scenarios, unless 
otherwise stated, welfare changes for remaining simulations are discussed relative to the CAT 
scenario. Table 3 also reports the U.S. CO2-e price, which is around $86/Mt CO2-e in the CAT 
scenario. 
Table 3. Changes in welfare and the price of crude oil relative to BAU (%), and U.S. CO2-e 
price, 2025. 
 CAT US-ALL 
CLT-
ALL 
US-MNF 
CLT-
MNF 
OILTAX 
Welfare (EV, %):       
USA -1.16 -1.27 -1.15 -1.26 -1.17 -1.21 
Coalition (U.S. included) -0.92 -0.88 -0.79 -0.90 -0.85 -1.02 
Coalition (U.S. excluded) -0.75 -0.60 -0.53 -0.64 -0.62 -0.89 
Non-coalition -0.23 -0.89 -1.41 -0.74 -1.07 -0.29 
World -0.70 -0.88 -0.98 -0.85 -0.92 -0.79 
U.S. CO2-e price ($/ton) 86.6 86.2 86.3 86.5 86.6 86.1 
Crude oil price (%) -6.2 -11.3 -13.1 -10.1 -11.1 0.0 
BCAs influence welfare in three ways. First, as is well known, tariffs create production and 
consumption inefficiencies. Second, tariffs improve market access for coalition exporters at the 
expense of non-coalition firms. Third, tariffs generate terms of trade effects, which are 
considerable when commodities are differentiated by country of origin (Brown, 1987). In the 
U.S.-ALL simulation, U.S. welfare decreases due to efficiency losses. BCAs also induce a 
substitution in U.S. purchases towards goods shipped from coalition regions, resulting in a 
welfare improvement in the coalition and a welfare loss in the non-coalition. Welfare losses are 
largest in Mexico, Higher Income East Asia and China, all of which export large quantities of 
goods to the U.S. There is also a large fall in welfare in the Middle East, which is driven by a 
further decline in the price of Crude oil. 
When the coalition imposes tariffs on all products, CLT-ALL, market access and terms of 
trade gains outweigh efficiency losses in the coalition so welfare for the coalition increases (from 
-0.92 in the CAT scenario to -0.79). Welfare in the non-coalition falls (from -0.23% in the CAT 
scenario to –1.41%) and, as in U.S.-ALL, the largest losers are Mexico, Higher Income East 
Asia, China and the Middle East. It is also interesting to compare welfare changes for the CLT-
ALL and U.S.-ALL scenarios. First, U.S. welfare improves when the coalition imposes tariffs 
relative to when only the U.S. levies tariffs due to market access effects. Second, the numbers 
reveal that nearly all of the decrease in welfare in Mexico and about two-thirds of that for China 
is brought about by U.S. BCAs. 
Welfare impacts for the U.S.-MNF scenario are qualitatively similar to those for U.S.-ALL, 
but are smaller in magnitude. That is, BCAs reduce welfare in the U.S. and non-coalition regions 
and increase welfare in other coalition regions, but by relatively small amounts. In the CLT-
MNF scenario, coalition manufacturing tariffs raise welfare in some coalition regions and reduce 
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welfare in non-coalition regions, as in CLT-ALL, and the largest losers are Mexico, Higher 
Income East Asia, China, the FSU, and the Middle East. The results also indicate that BCAs 
have little impact on the U.S. CO2-e price. 
4.2 Output changes 
Output changes relative to CAT outcomes are presented in Table 4. In each sector, producers 
respond to changes in tariff-inclusive import prices. Tariffs imposed by the U.S. in U.S.-ALL are 
reported in Table A2.8 In addition to displaying U.S. tariffs on imports from each non-coalition 
region, the table presents value-weighted U.S. tariffs on imports from the non-coalition group 
and on imports from all regions (where BCAs on imports from coalition regions are zero). The 
all-region value-weighted energy intensive tariff is only 4.4% despite large tariffs on Energy 
intensive industry imports from the non-coalition, as 90% of U.S. imports of this commodity are 
sourced from other coalition regions (and do not attract BCAs). In contrast, the share of coalition 
commodities sourced from the non-coalition in U.S. imports of Agriculture, Other industry and 
Services is 44%, 62% and 57% respectively. As a result, Agriculture attracts the largest value-
weighted tariff (19.7%) and value-weighted tariffs for Other industry, Services and 
Transportation are higher than that for Energy intensive industry. Consequently, U.S. energy 
intensive output falls and Agriculture production expands in the U.S.-ALL scenario.9 These 
results indicate that U.S. BCAs on all products will not be successful in addressing 
competiveness concerns. However, in CLT-ALL, there is a small increase (0.17%) in U.S. 
energy intensive production as coalition regions substitute away from non-coalition varieties. If 
BCAs are only included for manufacturing, as in the U.S.-MNF and CLT-MNF scenarios, 
Agriculture output decreases, while manufacturing output rises relative to the CAT scenario (by 
0.64% for energy-intensive products and 0.60% for Other industry in the U.S.-MNF scenario). 
Not reported in the table, we also consider scenarios where BCAs are only imposed on energy 
intensive sectors. As expected, energy intensive output increases by more in these scenarios 
relative to when BCAs are applied to manufacturing (by 1.8% in the U.S.-only scenario and 
2.3% in the coalition scenario). By comparison, energy intensive output falls by 3.6% (not 
reported in Table 4) in the CAT scenario. 
Table 4 also reports production changes in the coalition (excluding the U.S.) and the non-
coalition. In the coalition, production changes are a function of tariff-induced import price 
changes and markets access effects so, relative to other sectors, Agriculture expands by the most 
when tariffs are applied to all sectors and energy intensive production increases by the largest 
proportion in the two MNF scenarios. In the non-coalition, in U.S.-ALL there is only a small 
decrease (0.06%) in energy intensive production. This is because the tariff-induced decrease in 
U.S. demand is partially offset by increased use of non-coalition energy intensive goods as inputs 
                                                             
8 As tariffs for other scenarios depend on sectoral GHG emissions and coalition carbon prices, which are similar in 
all simulations, we do not report carbon tariffs for other scenarios. 
9 In this scenario, as expected, unreported calculations show that domestic consumption of U.S. energy intensive 
commodities increases (by 1.4%) but, as U.S. exporters face greater competition from non-coalition producers 
and increased production costs, U.S. energy intensive exports fall by 11.1%. 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to energy intensive and Other industry production in coalition regions, which expand exports to 
the U.S. Other non-coalition output changes are less complicated: in both the U.S.-ALL and 
CLT-ALL scenarios, the largest proportional sectoral production decline is for Agriculture, 
which faces high tariffs; and in the two MNF scenarios there are large reductions in energy 
intensive and other manufacturing production.  
Table 4. Output volume changes relative to the CAT scenario, %, 2025. 
 U.S.-ALL CLT-ALL U.S.-MNF CLT-MNF 
(a) U.S.A     
Agriculture 1.81 1.79 -1.31 -1.71 
Coal -2.79 -3.24 -2.00 -2.65 
Oil -0.58 -1.66 -1.58 -2.17 
Refined oil -1.23 -0.91 -0.39 -0.37 
Gas -0.37 -0.87 -0.54 -0.80 
Electricity -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.07 
Energy int. industry -0.13 0.17 0.64 1.11 
Other industry  -0.11 -0.18 0.60 0.71 
Services -0.20 -0.21 -0.35 -0.39 
Transportation -1.32 -1.37 -2.40 -3.02 
(b) Coalition (excluding the U.S.)    
Agriculture 0.49 1.21 -0.58 -1.01 
Coal -2.16 -3.16 -1.48 -2.95 
Oil -1.27 -2.48 -1.41 -2.15 
Refined oil -0.32 -0.25 -0.25 -0.35 
Gas -0.50 -1.28 -0.53 -1.09 
Electricity -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.08 
Energy int. industry 0.09 0.20 0.46 1.01 
Other industry  0.07 -0.15 0.40 0.54 
Services -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.27 
Transportation -0.75 -1.03 -1.39 -2.33 
(c) Non-coalition     
Agriculture -0.33 -0.81 -0.58 -0.15 
Coal 0.56 0.42 -0.10 0.30 
Oil 0.06 0.21 0.25 0.21 
Refined oil -0.32 -0.25 0.13 -0.35 
Gas 0.03 -0.10 -0.25 -0.17 
Electricity -0.34 -0.72 -0.05 -0.76 
Energy int. industry -0.06 -0.17 -0.39 -1.36 
Other industry  -0.40 -0.33 -0.60 -1.19 
Services 0.05 -0.02 -0.79 0.66 
Transportation -0.14 -0.73 0.38 1.64 
4.3 Leakage 
GHG emissions and the leakage rate, calculated as the increase in non-coalition emissions 
divided by the decrease in coalition emissions, both relative to BAU, are reported in Table 5. 
The leakage rate is 10.1% in the CAT scenario, indicating that non-coalition emissions increase 
by about ten CO2-e tons for every 100 CO2-e tons of emissions abated in the coalition. The 
leakage rate is 7.1%, about one-third lower, when the U.S. imposes BCAs on all sectors. In CLT-
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ALL, leakage is 3.8%, around 60% lower than in the CAT scenario. Leakage rates for U.S.-MNF 
(7.0%) and CLT-MNF (4.2%) are similar to those for the corresponding scenarios when BCAs 
are applied to all sectors. We also calculate leakage rates when BCAs are applied only on 
energy-intensive sectors (not reported in Table 5). In these scenarios, leakage is 7.9% in the U.S-
only case and 5.8% in the coalition scenario, which indicates that around 70% of tariff-induced 
leakage reductions result from tariffs on energy-intensive products. The leakage calculations also 
suggest that around one-half of the leakage reduction brought about by BCAs result from U.S. 
border measures. 
Table 5. CO2-e GHG emissions (100 million Mt) and leakage, 2025. 
 
BAU CAT 
U.S.-
ALL 
CLT-ALL 
U.S.-
MNF 
CLT-
MNF 
OILTAX 
Coalition 164.8 113.0 113.0 113.0 113.0 113.0 113.0 
Non-coalition 393.5 398.7 397.2 395.5 397.2 395.7 395.7 
Leakage (%) - 10.1 7.1 3.8 7.0 4.2 4.3 
Although BCAs reduce leakage by up to 60%, the numbers mask small changes in global 
emissions. As displayed in Table 5, the coalition’s contribution to global emission is 22% and 
the non-coalition’s is 78% in the CAT scenario, so leakage calculations are sensitive to small 
proportional changes in non-coalition emissions. As a result, the 60% leakage reduction in CLT-
ALL – the largest tariff-induced leakage reduction – corresponds to a 0.8% fall in non-coalition 
emissions and only a 0.6% decrease in global emissions. When combined with the welfare 
changes reported in Table 3, the leakage calculations indicate that reducing emissions via BCAs 
is nearly six times as costly as using direct controls. In the CAT scenario, global emissions fall 
by 4.7 billion tons and global welfare declines by 0.7%, resulting in a welfare reduction of 0.15% 
per billion tons of abatement. The corresponding number for CLT-ALL is 0.88%. 
5. ALTERNATIVE LEAKAGE CONTROLS 
At least two other policy measures can be used to address leakage concerns. First, Burniaux et 
al. (2008), Fisher and Fox (2009) and McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2009) claim that the most 
important source of leakage arises from reductions in the global oil price induced by coalition 
GHG restrictions, which raise oil-intensive consumption in regions with no GHG controls. 
Accordingly, in a another scenario (OILTAX), we impose an endogenous tax on Crude oil 
production, applied uniformly across regions, so that the tax-inclusive Crude oil price is the same 
as in BAU. Such a tax is an unlikely outcome from climate negotiations but could represent oil 
producers exercising monopoly power to stabilize the world oil price. Second, direct controls 
(cap-and-trade system and/or energy efficiency mandates in non-coalition regions) can also 
reduce leakage. Here one might view the threat of BCAs as a way for the climate coalition to 
coerce other nations to restrict GHG emissions.10 To investigate this alternative, instead of 
BCAs, we impose cap-and-trade programs in non-coalition regions in addition to carbon 
                                                             
10 Alternatively, unilateral emissions reductions by the coalition may create self-interested emission reductions by 
the non-coalition (Copeland and Taylor, 2005). 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restrictions in the CAT scenario. The emission cap for each non-coalition region in this scenarios 
is set at emissions observed in the CLT-ALL scenario. In another simulation, we use cap-and-
trade systems to determine non-coalition carbon prices that eliminate leakage by returning 
emissions in each non-coalition region to emissions in BAU. 
In our OILTAX simulation, a global tax on Crude oil production of 11.3% is required to 
equate the tax inclusive Crude oil price in the CAT scenario to that for BAU. As indicated in 
Table 3, aggregate welfare for the coalition when there is an oil tax is lower than in all of the 
BCA scenarios. This is because the terms of trade for the coalition (which is a net-importer of 
oil) improves as a result of BCAs but declines when there is an oil tax. The opposite is true for 
the non-coalition (which is a net-exporter of oil). Interestingly, the OILTAX leakage rate (4.3%) 
is higher than the CTL-ALL leakage rate (3.8%). That is, trade measures appear to be as 
effective at reducing leakage as oil price controls. This finding concurs with and Rutherford 
(1993) but refutes recent conjectures that, “in practice, the most important source of mechanism 
through which leakage could occur would be world oil markets, not trade in manufactured 
goods” (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2009, p. 3). 
When we apply cap-and-trade policies in the non-coalition, emissions are reduced to levels in 
the CTL-ALL scenario by CO2-e prices less than $0.01 per ton in the non-coalition (except 
Mexico, where the CO2-e price is $0.29) and welfare changes are very small.11 Indeed, 
proportional welfare changes are only distinguishable from CAT values at very high levels of 
precision, so we do not report welfare changes when cap-and trade programs are imposed on the 
non-coalition. Furthermore, eliminating leakage by non-coalition cap-and trade policies requires 
CO2-e prices less than $0.01 per ton in all non-coalition regions except in Mexico ($0.48) and the 
FSU ($0.02), which also have minor welfare effects. It is likely that near-term non-coalition cap-
and-trade policies are infeasible, either because the non-coalition refuses to bind emissions 
and/or because tiny carbon prices render such systems impractical, so efficiency improvements 
may be a more feasible way of reducing emissions. In this connection, BCAs reduce Chinese 
emissions by 3.7 million tons in the CLT-ALL scenario so, assuming replacing a standard light 
bulb with a compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulb saves 100 kilograms of CO2-e emissions per 
year, Chinese leakage could be offset by the same amount if one in ten of China’s 360 million 
households installing a single CFL bulb.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We evaluated the potential for BCAs to reduce leakage using an economy-wide model 
focusing on 2025. We found that BCAs reduce leakage by around 30% when imposed by the 
U.S. and about 60% when levied by all coalition countries. However, as the non-coalition 
accounts for more than three-quarters of global emissions, large proportional leakage changes 
                                                             
11 Small non-coalition carbon prices reflect low initial emissions reduction costs in this region. As shown by 
Carbone et al. (2009), cheap abatement opportunities in developing countries provide scope for international 
trade in emissions permits even in the absence of a global cooperative agreement. 
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mask small changes in emissions – when leakage fell by 60%, non-coalition emissions fell by 
0.8% and global emissions declined by only 0.6%. 
Although BCAs have small emission impacts, they have pronounced welfare effects. When 
the coalition imposed BCAs on all products, the change in coalition welfare improved from -
0.75% in the CAT scenario to -0.53%, but the change in non-coalition welfare deteriorated from 
-0.23% to -1.41%. The net result was a worsening in world welfare from -0.70% in the CAT 
scenario to -0.98% (for an almost negligible reduction in global emissions). As an alternative to 
BCAs, we considered pricing non-coalition GHG emissions so that, in each region, emission 
levels equaled those observed when BCAs are employed. CO2-e prices that achieve this objective 
were around one-tenth of one cent in nearly all regions and had negligible welfare effects. Cap-
and-trade programs with such small carbon prices may not be viable, so the adoption of modest 
energy efficiency improvements in the non-coalition may be a more practical solution.  
These findings suggest that non-coalition regions may wish to adopt emissions controls as 
part of a global agreement, providing such measures prevent the coalition from adopting BCAs. 
China recently announced plans to reduce its 2020 GHG emissions to GDP ratio by 45% relative 
to 2005 through GHG efficiency improvements, so an agreement binding China to this goal (or a 
slightly more ambitious target) may be a viable alternative to BCAs. However, as leakage 
reductions achieved by modest non-coalition controls will still leave coalition producers at a cost 
disadvantage relative to imports from the non-coalition, it remains to be seen whether coalition 
politicians will be willing to strike out BCAs. 
Regarding competiveness concerns, BCAs applied to all sectors will not necessarily increase 
energy intensive output. This is because, relative to other sectors, a high proportion of coalition 
energy intensive imports are sourced from other coalition regions and do not attract BCAs. 
Consequently, the energy intensive tariff value-weighted across sources is lower than value-
weighted tariffs for some other sectors. However, BCAs applied only to manufacturing raise 
domestic manufacturing output but do not fully offset the impact of domestic carbon restrictions. 
If the U.S. acts unilaterally, BCAs are detrimental to U.S. exports and increase the cost of 
climate policy. 
We also evaluated the conjecture that trade in goods is a minor leakage source compared to 
the oil-price channel. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we found that comprehensive coalition 
BCAs reduced leakage to a greater extent than measures that offset the decrease in the price of 
Crude oil caused by coalition emissions restrictions. Nevertheless, we do not recommend using 
BCAs to address leakage concerns. Instead, we conclude that although the political landscape in 
the U.S. and other Annex 1 nations may call for BCAs to control leakage and address 
competitiveness concerns, BCAs are imprecise instruments that, even when finely tuned to target 
embodied GHG emissions, cause much collateral damage. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Welfare changes relative to BAU (%), 2025 
 CAT 
U.S.-
ALL 
CLT-ALL 
U.S.-
MNF 
CLT-
MNF 
OILTAX 
U.S. -1.16 -1.27 -1.15 -1.26 -1.17 -1.21 
Canada -4.40 -3.92 -4.30 -3.90 -4.25 -4.14 
Japan -0.07 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.10 -0.20 
Australia-New Zealand -2.08 -2.03 -2.22 -2.07 -2.32 -2.10 
Europe Union -0.60 -0.46 -0.35 -0.51 -0.47 -0.77 
Eastern Europe -0.96 -0.79 -0.43 -0.89 -0.61 -1.34 
Mexico -0.36 -1.77 -1.98 -1.57 -1.71 -0.32 
Former Soviet Union -0.58 -0.91 -1.52 -0.79 -1.19 -0.30 
Higher Income E. Asia 0.18 -0.75 -1.28 -0.65 -1.04 -0.32 
China 0.10 -0.90 -1.59 -0.73 -1.24 -0.22 
India 0.60 0.15 -0.28 0.16 -0.19 -0.07 
Indonesia -0.24 -0.77 -1.20 -0.62 -0.89 -0.25 
Africa -1.16 -1.59 -2.42 -1.31 -1.67 -0.53 
Middle East -2.79 -3.60 -4.36 -3.25 -3.60 -0.95 
Latin America -0.27 -0.64 -0.86 -0.48 -0.57 -0.24 
Rest of World 0.39 0.17 -0.26 0.26 -0.02 -0.10 
 
Table A2. U.S. 2025 carbon tariffs in the U.S.-ALL simulation (%). 
 AGRI COAL OIL ROIL GAS ELEC EINT OTHR SERV TRAN 
MEX 18.4  - 11.5 0.8 96.3 21.1 10.7 3.2 11.7 
FSU 67.2 53.4 - 10.1 4.0 261.4 57.4 28.0 14.1 24.9 
ASI 44.6  - 6.3 2.5 45.8 22.3 13.4 6.3 17.9 
CHN 38.3 104.1 - 15.5 2.3 221.3 54.8 29.1 21.3 23.6 
IND 46.3 21.9 - 11.4  132.9 48.7 31.0 12.9 27.0 
AFR 47.5 6.7 - 5.5 1.8  40.6 17.9 6.7 17.3 
IDZ 52.1 16.4 - 10.7 7.8 111.1 39.8 23.7 14.7 20.6 
MES 48.6  - 7.7 2.9 77.1 36.1 21.5 15.3 29.0 
LAM 44.0 17.2 - 6.7 2.7 38.8 15.4 12.2 4.1 14.8 
ROW 41.5 115.3 - 11.5 2.6 102.9 33.6 19.2 7.9 12.5 
Non-
coalition 
32.7 13.9 3.2 7.6 6.3 95.0 29.7 17.5 12.1 18.9 
All 
regions 
19.7 8.2 3.2 4.5 0.3 5.0 4.4 7.3 5.1 5.1 
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